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THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM AND THE
DECISIONMAKING INDEPENDENCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
LESSONS FOR A PROPOSED
FEDERAL PROGRAM
MALCOLM C. RICH·
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago administrative law judges were so well hidden
from America's justice system that they were sometimes called "the
hidden judiciary."1 Yet this administrative judiciary continues to
playa major role in deciding not only decisions regarding individual
financial well-being but policy decisions as well. There are more
than 4,000 federal and state administrative law judges. 2
Administrative law judges serve numerous agencies at both the
state and federal levels, resolving often complex disputes between
agencies and the public in such diverse areas as commerce, commu
nications, health and safety, social security and rates for gas, electric
and telephone service. Although their decisions are "initial deci
sions" subject to review, in practice most become the final agency
opinion; what they decide thus affects the daily lives of virtually
everyone.
Historically, administrative adjudication has evolved from a
time in which hearing examiners were used merely to improve effi
ciency by gathering facts for use by agency officials. 3 In the more
• Director, Foundation for Educational Research, Inc., a nonprofit research center
located in Chicago. J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1979.
This article is based in part on a monograph by Mr. Rich and Wayne E. Brucar, The
CenJrai Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven Slates, © 1983,
American Judicature Society. Published with permission of the American Judicature
Society and University Publications of America, Inc.
1. See, e.g., Mans, Selecting tire Hidden Judiciary;, 63 JUDICATURE 60 (1979).
2. The hearing process in both systems often emphasizes legal representation and
the use of evidentiary and procedural rules. Particularly in administrative regulatory ad
judication, administrative law judges now resemble judges in their duties as finders of
fact or as decision makers or both.
3. See Davis, Judicialization ofAdministrative Law: TIre Trial-Type Hearing and lire
Clranging Status of tire Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389, 391-92.
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recent period of judicialization, the hearing process more closely re
sembles the formal, independent model of our general jurisdiction
courtS.4
However, this evolution did not resolve the question of the sta
tus of administrative law judges - are they agency employees or are
they members of an independent judiciary that is assigned to the
administrative system of justice? This contlict has come to the fore
front in the last seven years, during which a series of events have
precipitated proposed legislation and litigation that consistently call
into question the role of the administrative law judge.s
During the Carter Administration, vigorous attempts were
made to enact legislation that would have provided for a fixed term
of office and mandatory performance evaluations for administrative
law judges.6 Several groups of administrative law judges have sued
their agency, the Social Security Administration, concerning what
the judges deemed to be illegal evaluations of their performance. 7
Professor Victor Rosenblum states in his article for this symposium:
Push has been coming to shove recently in sectors of the rela
tionships between admjnjstrative law judges and employing agen
cies, with conflicts at the Social Security Administration in the
visible forefront. The lure and trauma of battle over the power of
agencies to prescribe and sanction methodologies and outputs for
administrative law judges have left in limbo implementation of
earlier consensus-oriented proposals for incremental improve
ments in the selection and monitoring of the judges and have, in
stead, placed priorities on legal jousts before the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and the federal courts. s

Most of the attention has been focused on the federal adminis
trative law judge and the literature dealing with the changing federal
administrative system is voluminous. Comparatively little attention
4. These actions were embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. ch.
324.60 Stat. 231 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 101-106,1305,3105,3344,6362,
1562 (1982». For an in depth discussion of the role of the federal administrative law
judge, see V. ROSENBLUM, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS: INTERRELATION OF CASE LAW WITH STATUTORY AND PRAGMATIC FACTORS
IN DETERMINING AU ROLES,printed in SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO
THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND ApPEALS CRISIS 111 (Comm. Print 1915).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 29-40.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
8. Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion for Re
moval of Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
593, 593-94 (1984) (footnote omitted).
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has been paid to state administrative agencies. Yet state administra
tive agencies attempt to regulate the quality of life, and substantially
more lawyers argue before state agencies than before federal ones.
Thus, some of the same issues of efficiency and fairness that affect
the federal system now affect states as well, and they are working to
resolve these issues in a new way. The approach that eight states
have implemented is the central panel system in which judges are
not employed by the agencies providing the cases they hear but by a
distinct agency created solely to manage the state's administrative
law judges. Each central panel states' administrative procedure act
defines the panels' jurisdiction of agency business. 9
Thus, while federal administrative law judges at the federal
level continue to battle their agencies over the question of whether
they are an independent judiciary, the states are now providing an
experimental model for the federal government to explore. JO The
central panel notion brings into focus three general but critical issues
surrounding the administrative process. The first issue has to do with
fairness and the question of which approach is the most equitable
from the vantages of both the agency and the individual parties to a
dispute. The second question is which approach to delivering admin
istrative adjudication provides the most competent but also in
dependent as well as an unbiased administrative law judge. The
third issue is which system can provide equity to all parties and do so
in the most cost-effective way in this era of shrinking resources.
The purpose of this article is first to describe the operating pro
cedures of existing central panel systems, including the role of the
administrative law judge within them. Second, as part of the discus
sion regarding the administrative law judge role, the article will dis
cuss the notion of performance evaluation. Third, the work will
conclude with lessons for the proposed federal central panel of ad
ministrative law judges derived from past experiences with evalua
9. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR. THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRA
TIVE LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 29 (1983). See also. Levinson. The Cen
tra/ Panel System: A Framework tho/ Separates AUsfr0m AdministratiYe Agencies. 65
JUDICATURE 236. 237 nn. 2-3 (1981). The central panel states are: California. Colorado.
Florida. New Jersey. Massachusetts. Minnesota. Washington and Tennessee. M. RICH &
W. BRUCAR. supra. at 2.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. While the state and federal adminis
trative systems are different in terms of number of administrative law judges and the
subject matter of hearings. experimental approaches such as the central panel provide
working models of different types of organizational structures which serve to translate
the expertise of administrative law judges and lawyers into tangible results.
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tion in the federal sector and from the state models provided by
existing central panel systems.

II.

THE CENTRAL PANEL ApPROACH: A DESCRIPTION

The central panel system is an approach utilized by eight states
and the City of New York and is an option available to the states
under the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure ACt. 11 Con
ceptually, it can be placed between the federal approach to utiliza
tion of administrative law judges l2 and that of an administrative
court 13 with regard to the degree of separation between administra
tive law judges and their agencies. Under the central panel arrange
ment, administrative law judges are employed by an agency created
solely for their complete management. 14 Where the system is in ef
fect, use of central panel administrative law judges is either required
by agencies delineated in the state's APA or is. at the discretion of the
state agencies. IS These administrative law judges are assigned to pre
side over hearings when state agencies so request. 16 The central
panel does not change the power of the administrative law judges;
administrative law judge decisions are usually recommended deci
sions subject to the agencies' adoption. 17
A. Advantages 0/ a Central Panel
Throughout its existence, administrative adjudication has been
faced with a tradeoff between providing a fair proceeding for the
litigant and providing justice expediently. One result of the tradeoff
has been an ongoing tension between agency policymakers and hear
ing officers who must apply those policies to everyday occurrences. A
central pool system attempts to alleviate the tension by separating
the hearing officers from the agency officials and thereby better de
fine the role of each. IS
In these days of government budget accounting, administrative
II. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was adopted in 1946 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to serve as a guide for
the states. It was revised in 1961 and most recently in 1981 and has been adopted (with
some variations) in at least 28 states.
12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
13. See generally de Seife, Administrative Low Reform: A Focus on tile Administra
tive Low Judge, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 229 (1979).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 9, at 12-13.

1984]

PROPOSED FEDERAL PANEL SYSTEM

647

agencies are hard pressed to decide how much due process is enough
consistent with how much they can afford to give litigants. From a
jurisprudential point of view, the central panel approach seeks to
provide due process of law through a separation of legislative and
judicial powers. But it offers a variety of other advantages, as well,
according to its advocates. 19
It is proposed that:
(a) By more efficiently allocating hearing examiners, the system
is less expensive than assigning administrative law judges per
manently to one agency. Larger agencies will not have to keep
all the administrative law judges they need to handle cases dur
ing peak periods. Small agencies will always have administra
tive law judges available to them without having to pay the
larger sums to hire lawyers, for example, to serve as temporary
administrative law judges. 20
(b) If administrative law judges are not under the control of a
single administrative agency, proponents say, they may feel
compelled to render longer, more reasoned justifications for
their decisions. 21
(c) A central pool allows one administrative staff to handle the
bookkeeping related to the employment of administrative law
judges. And locating administrative law judges in one office al
lows administrative cost cutting innovations to be
implemented. 22
(d) A central panel would reduce any administrative law judge
bias in favor of the agency to which they would be otherwise
assigned, thereby enhancing public confidence in the adminis
trative system. 23
(e) By providing administrative law judges the opportunity for
a diversification of experience, the central panel would help
keep administrative law judges from becoming stale due to re
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id. It should be noted that this and most other claimed advantages of the
central panel system cannot be conclusively documented. Id. at 14.
21. Id. at 13 (quoting Hearings on Administrative Law Judge System Before Sub
comm. for Consumers of tlte Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transporlation,
96th Cong., 2d Scss. 28, 1980) (Testimony of Judge William Fauver).
22. Id. (quoting Lubbers, A Un!fied Corps of ALJs: A Proposal 10 Tesillte Idea at
tlte Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 274 (1981».
23. Adminislralive Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before lite Subcomm.
on Administralive Praclice and Procedure of tlte Senate Comm. on ,lte Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1983) (statement of Loren A. Smith, Chairman. Administrative
Conference of the United States).
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peatedly hearing similar cases. Such diversification could also
serve as a recruitment tool so as to attract the best qualified in
dividuals to the administrative law judge position. 24
(f) Use of a central panel may provide a more objective envi
ronment for evaluation of administrative law judge perform
ance. Administrative agencies ''would have a less immediate
interest in the evaluation of any particular judge, and there
would be greater possibility for designing an objective and cred
ible system for performance evaluation."2s

B. lJisadvantages of the Central Panel System
The first of two articulated disadvantages is that the central
panel office will become a "super-agency"- that is, it will develop
collective policies and procedures that usurp the powers of the ad
ministrative agencies. Opponents of the central pool claim the idea is
another step towards judicialization and is, therefore, another step
toward reducing the power of agency officials. 26
However, some proponents of the approach see this as a benefit.
The conflict stems from the tradeoff between due process and admin
istrative effectiveness that administrators claim they need to make
and implement policies. ludicialization is, in this view, an unneces
sary shackling of that discretion. The further administrative law
judges are from the agencies, the greater the shackling of the admin
istrators; yet it is the administrative discretion that some proponents
wish to confine by means of the central panel notion.
The second purported disadvantage is related to organizational
structure. Opponents think that placing all decisions relating to ad.;.
ministrative law judge employment in the hands of just one agency
or one central panel director risks creating, or the appearance of cre
ating, a different kind of bias. Central panel director8-i>ften polit
ical appointees-are responsible for the decisions relating to hiring,
promoting, evaluating and setting salary for administrative law
judges. Opponents view this arrangement as potentially creating a
nonobjective environment for hearings. 27
24. Id. at 110.
25. Id.
26. Id.; Lakusta, Operations in an Agency not Subject to tire APA: Public Utilities
Commission, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 218, 218 (1956).
27. See Rich, Adapting tire Central Panel System: A Study ofSeven Siaies. 65 JUDI
CATURE 246. 251-52 (1981).
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THE CENTRAL PANEL ApPROACH: INDEPENDENCE AND
EVALUATION

A goal of the central panel is to promote more objective and
efficient adjudication by separating administrative law judges from
the agencies they serve. It is one approach intended to balance the
need for administrative justice with the goal of efficient and effective
administrative action. But the central panel approach has provided
only the framework for separating administrative law judges from
the agencies. The states have individualized the operating proce
dures to their larger political and economic environments. The result
has been central panel systems that differ along such dimensions as
means of funding, the types of agencies served, and the role of the
central panel directors. This flexibility is an important characteristic
that the federal government and any state interested in implement
ing the central panel approach must recognize.
Because the central panel system separates the administrative
law judge from the agency, the extent to which the system affects the
administrative law judge role is an important component when con
sidering the viability of the pool approach and the lessons the ap
proach may have for a proposed federal pool system. Proponents of
an administrative judiciary free of agency influence state that admin
istrative law judges deserve the judicial independence granted to
state and federal court judges. Evaluation, as much as any other
issue, has been seen as a challenge to administrative law judge inde
pendence. Legislative initiatives to require evaluation have been suc
cessfully defeated and groups of administrative law judges have filed
legal actions to stop what they see as illegal performance evalua
tion. 28 Yet proponents cling to the beliefthat evaluation will produce
a more accountable and therefore more effective administrative sys
tem and that that evaluation can be accomplished without placing
administrative law judge decisionmaking independence into
jeopardy.
Society utilizes evaluation to make basic decisions in both the
private and public sectors. People's livelihoods can be enhanced or
destroyed depending on whether supervisors check "good" or
"poor" on standardized evaluation forms. Bar associations influence
the judiciary by releasing results of evaluative bar polls just prior to
elections. The evaluation of administrative law judges has also be
28. Su infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
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come a political factor-an issue that has been subject to congres
sional inquiry as well as litigation.
In the late 1970's, there were attempts by the Carter Administra
tion and members of Congress to apply the precepts of evaluation to
administrative law judges. Evaluating the performance of these ad
ministrative judges was to be the fuel to make them more accounta
ble. But, as the usual case when evaluation is applied, there was
little that was definitive in terms of goals and criteria. The adminis
trative law judges were outraged and lobbied heavily against the leg
islative actions. 29
One bill which provided for evaluation was Senate bill 262.30
When it was proposed during the late 1970's, it prescribed no sub
stantive standards for administrative law judge status and tenure and
would have required evaluation ofjudges by the administrator of the
Administrative Conference of the United States in accordance with
the standards and processes prescribed. All administrative law
judges would be subject to removal or reduction in grade for "unac
ceptable performance."31 In addition, administrative law judges ap
pointed after the effective date of the bill would have been appointed
for terms of ten years subject to reappointment by the administrator
of the Administrative Conference upon determination of each case
as to whether the administrative law judge was "affirmatively quali
fied to be reappointed."32
The bill would have established performance review boards, at
least half of whose members would be administrative law judges.
The administrator was to establish performance appraisal systems
for administrative law judges, setting standards for:
the evaluation of whether any administrative law judge [had] per
formed the duties of his office in a fair, impartial, and effective
manner. The performance standard [would have], to the maxi
mum extent feasible, permit[ted] the evaluation of job perform
ance on the basis of criteria related to duties and responsibilities of
administrative law judges. 33
29. Despite vigorous efforts by the Carter administration, no bill proposing terms
of office and evaluation was successful. It is useful to discuss these efforts, however, be
cause they provide instruction on the problems of implementing evaluation procedures.
30. S. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
31. Id. § 4322(b).
32. Id. § 4323(b).
33. Id. § 4322(b). Under § 4322(c), the number and composition of performance
review boards is not otherwise specified, except that a board conducting an evaluation of
any particular administrative law judge may not have as a member any individual who is
an employee of the agency employing the administrative law judge.
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The performance review board would have been required to conduct
evaluations during the third and tenth years of administrative law
judge terms. The evaluation report issued during the tenth year of
the term, would include a recommendation regarding reappoint
ment. The findings of any evaluation would have been provided to
the administrative law judge in a written report "and, if applicable,
to the chief administrative law judge for the agency in which the
administrative law judge [was] employed."34
In addition to legislative efforts to impose evaluation on admin
istrative law judges at the federal level, litigation has also been uti
lized by Social Security administrative law judges to dispute the use
of performance evaluation. In Nash v. Calfano,3S the Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit was asked to deal with the issue of
whether an administrative law judge had standing to sue when an
agency allegedly interfered with his or her decisional independence.
The district court judge had ruled that Simon Nash, an administra
tive law judge, for the Social Security Administration, had not suf
fered the injury-in-fact required for standing when he was subjected
to the bureau's program of monitoring, reviewing, and allegedly con
trolling administrative law judge decisions. Among other conten
tions, Judge Nash complained that arbitrary monthly production
quotas had been established by the agency and that what the agency
designated as a "quality assurance program" was in reality an at
tempt to direct a number of decisions awarding or denying social
security benefits. Administrative law judges deviating from the aver
age fifty percent reversal rate from all decisions were allegedly coun
selled and admonished to bring their rate in line with the national
average on payment sanctions. 36
Judge Kaufman closed the panel's unanimous decision that
Judge Nash had standing to sue with the following admonition to
the district court on remand:
By providing an authoritative delineation of the respective
rights and powers of the parties to this litigation, and by recogniz
ing that good administration must not encroach upon adjudicative
independence, the district court on remand will have the opportu
nity to advance the principle goal of judicial and cause that judi
cial administration: reduction of delay without compromise to the
demands of due process, of which judicial independence is but
34. Id. § 4322(c).
35. 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Id. at 13.
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one, important part.37
Nash was recently distinguished, however, by the Seventh Cir
cuit Court of Appeals in the case of D'Amico v. Schweiker.38 In that
case, seven Social Security administrative law judges filed a com
plaint in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Social Security
Administration from compelling them to apply a new agency policy
regarding repayment of disability benefits received after cessation of
a disability. The district court judge dismissed the case on the merits,
but the Seventh Circuit held on appeal that the administrative law
judges lacked standing to sue. In so doing, Judge Posner distin
guished Nash although it appears that, in actuality, he may have
simply been disagreeing with the Second Circuit. He described the
Second Circuit's opinion as having challenged "housekeeping as dis
tinct from substantive directives."39 Unlike Nash, the D'Amico ac
tion placed the judicial officer "in the position of taking sides in
controversies that he is supposed to adjudicate impartially."40
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) recently added
fuel to the fire over the status of federal administrative law judges.
In April, 1983, in Social Security Administration v. Goodman,41 an
administrative law judge of the MSPB recommended the removal of
an administrative law judge at the Social Security Administration
due to unacceptably low productivity. The Board reversed, stating
that if an agency's case rests upon comparative productivity statis
tics, "proof of their validity is an essential element of the agency's
cases."42
In Social Security Administration v. Brennan ,43 the MSPB found
that an administrative law judge's independence did not "provide
immunity from appropriate supervision."44 According to the opin
ion, administrative law judges were not justified in refusing to com
ply with reasonable management instructions that did not affect their
ability to render impartial adjudication. 4s
37. Id. at 17-18.
38. 698 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983).
39. Id. at 907.
40. Id.
41. No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Apr. 6, 1983) (recommended decision), rev'd, No.
HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984) (final decision).
42. No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 19 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984) (final decision).
43. No. HQ7521820010 (MSPB June 17, 1983).
44. Id., slip op. at 7.
45. /d.
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LESSONS TO BE LEARNED BY THOSE PROPOSING A FEDERAL
CENTRAL PANEL

The federal experience with evaluation of administrative law
judges has not been a good one. The proposed legislation of the late
1970's, the Nash and D'Amico litigation, and the Goodman adminis
trative action are all indicative of a festering discontent among the
nation's administrative judiciary.
In contrast, performance evaluation is part of the central panel
system, albeit some programs are more vigorous and more intluen
tial than others. One question is whether the differences in accept
ance and response to evaluation has more to do with the attitudes of
state hearing officers in contrast to those of federal administrative
judges or whether it has more to do with the method of evaluation
used by central panel systems. Professor Victor Rosenblum, a prom
inent administrative law scholar, has concluded that federal admin
istrative law judges have been unwilling to accept evaluation at least
in part because the programs proposed were not specifically designed
for application to administrative judges.46 Yet this phenomenon is
not uncommon. Evaluation has become an industry in and of itself
during the last twenty years. An article probing alternative concep
tions of evaluation identifies seven such conceptions: evaluation as
applied science; as system management; as decision theory; as assess
ment of progress toward goals; as jurisprudence; as descriptive por
trayal; and as rational empiricism. 47
But despite the vast array of purposes for which evaluation has
been regarded as magic elixir, the authors recognize a major contlict
between those who believe that a consensus on values can be fash
ioned and those who believe that evaluation "has been largely un
successful in resolving differences among groups who disagree on
values."48
This type of contlict can result in organized revolt such as that
of federal administrative law judges or it can result in the complete
disregard of evaluation results. Despite the abundance of credible
literature discussing it, evaluation does not have a uniformly under
stood meaning. The term "evaluation" carries so many contexts and
purposes that proposals merely stating that programs or people are
46. Rosenblum. Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Aspects of Purpose.
Policy. and Feasibility (Dec. 1983) (unpublished report to the Administrative Confer
ence) (cited with permission of the author).
47. Glass &: Ellett, Evaluation Research. 31 ANN. REV. OF PsYCHOLOGY 211 (1980).
48. [d. at 219.
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to be evaluated often meet fierce resistance by those who fear that
generalized evaluations will be used more for abuse than for con
structive use.
However, these and other problems notwithstanding, evaluation
appears to be here to stay. The trend in both the private and public
sectors is to use evaluation to "reduce uncertainties, improve effec
tiveness, and make decisions with regard to what those programs,
personnel, or products are doing and affecting."49 Related to this
trend is the upcoming consideration by Congress of the proposed
federal central panel with its overarching question of why an existing
system which has operated for nearly forty years (that is, since the
enactment of the APA) needs a major overhaul. Past experiences
involving the evaluation of federal administrative law judges and the
evaluation procedures utilized by on-going central panels provide
lessons for policymakers.
A.

Lessons From Past Experiences at the Federal Level

One of the largest problems with performance evaluation is that
before it will work effectively, the particular mode and methodology
in which it is delivered must be linked to the particular type ofjob or
person to be evaluated. "At both conceptual and operational levels,
evaluation scholars have endowed the term with multifaceted con
text and contents, so that generalized proposals for evaluation of
particular programs or personnel carry little that is definitive about
what is intended or what will endure."50 Senate bill 262's methods
of evaluation, similarly, did little to match its methodologies to the
particular profession that it was to evaluate. Neither the bill nor its
history provided any systematic appraisal of the administrative law
judges programs, strengths, weaknesses, history, experiences, conse
quences, and alternatives that would provide a foundation for the
shift to a term of years.
The bill did not state why the standards dictated by the federal
APA needed to be changed and, furthermore, did not elaborate on
the specific criteria that would be at the core of the evaluation pro
cess. The overall result was outrage and vigorous general opposition
by the nation's administrative law judges. 51 Applying an evaluation
49.

M. PATrON, PRACTICAL EVALUATION IS (1982).
Rosenblum, supra note 46.
51. Numerous administrative law judges testified before congressional subcommit
tees in opposition to the bills. Other administrative law judges filed position papers with
the legislatures and speeches denouncing the bills were common.

so.
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system or any other type of major change modifies the duties and
authority of many people - in this case, both administrative law
judges and agency personnel. The many facets of administration
must be considered, including the fact that the administrative pro
cess today more closely resembles general jurisdiction courts than it
did at the time of the passage of the federal APA. The events sur
rounding Senate bill 262 is a reminder that evaluation must include
realistic measures that are administered objectively and used only
for the purposes communicated in advance to those being evaluated.

B. Lessonsfrom the Central Panel Approach
Opponents of any type of evaluation of administrative law
judges cite general jurisdiction judges as examples. According to this
view, other judges are not evaluated formally because they must en
joy absolute independence if the judicial system is to remain impar
tial. For the same reasons, opponents of evaluation state that
administrative law judges should not be evaluated.
Proponents of the evaluation of administrative law judges claim
that administrative law judges should be accountable for their ac
tions; accountability, in their view, can only be accomplished
through the evaluation of administrative law judge performance.
Evaluation of administrative law judges in the central panel states is
part ofthe duties of the directors of the central panel agency. For the
most part, these evaluations take the form of annual reviews which,
in most states, bear upon salary increases granted to administrative
law judges. 52
Evaluation is very much a part of most central panel adminis
trative law judges careers. But does evaluation affect their decision
making independence? By using a questionnaire mail survey, a
recent study asked central panel administrative law judges whether
the presence of a performance evaluation system would jeopardize
their independence. More judges strongly disagree with the idea that
performance evaluation would jeopardize their independence than
those who agree. 53 This is somewhat surprising in light of the fairly
uniform opposition to performance evaluation on the part of the fed
eral administrative law judges. The same study tabulated the re
sponses to the question by state. The results vary substantially,
suggesting that the state central panel judges' viewpoints are not
52. See, M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 9, for a discussion of various evalua
tion systems used among the central panel systems.
53. Id. at 49, 61.
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fashioned by an organized response to the notion of performance
evaluation but, rather, by their individual experience. 54 Note then,
that in the State of New Jersey, where evaluation is among the most
rigorous of any of the central panel states, nearly three-fifths of the
responding administrative law judges stated that the presence of a
mechanism of evaluating their performance would not jeopardize
their independence. 55
In all central panel systems, performance evaluation is allowed,
but by virtue of the structure of the system, the central panel pro
vides a centralized location from which the evaluation of administra
tive law judges is conducted. Another imponant point is that
evaluation is the responsibility of the director of the central panel.
This means that the sensitive job of evaluating performance is di
rected by an individual who has day-to-day supervisory contact with
the administrative law judges. Through utilization of both the evalu
ator's judgment and the collection of standardized forms, the system
provides the opponunity for an informed decision that will be ac
cepted by the administrative law judges as being factual and
objective.
V.

CONCLUSION

The notion of performance evaluation has not been accepted by
the federal administrative law judge community while it is very
much a pan of the existing central panel approach. In asking why
such a difference exists, legislators should look to the state models
for possible answers. It should be noted also that the federal govern
ment provides a totally different environment for a central panel sys
tem than any state administrative process. As Jeff Lubbers of the
Administrative Conference stated:
[a] platoon of 41 New Jersey judges may work well, but 1100 fed
eral [administrative law judges] may make for an unmanageable
corps. Furthermore, five federal agencies now employ nearly 1000
[administrative law judges] and the other 24 employing agencies
average fewer than 7 judges each. Proponents of any reform must
bear the burden of attending to the practical details of its pro
posed application to such a bulk of our judiciary.56

Yet, despite the differences between the state and federal sys
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id. at 48-49.
56. Lubbers, A Un!fied Corps of AUs: A Proposal to Test tire Idea at tire Federal
LeYel, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 275 (1981).
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tems, Senate bill 1275,51 if enacted, will establish the framework for
a central panel of federal administrative law judges. That bill would
create a new administrative agency known as the Administrative
Law Judge Corps of the United States. As an agency, the Corps
would be subject to the various government regulations and admin
istrative housekeeping with which agencies must currently comply. 58
Its Council would consist of members appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate. 59 The Council would be authorized to
prescribe the rules of practice and procedure for the conduct of pro
ceedings before the corps except that procedural rules governing an
existing class of proceedings could not be changed for two years
without the agency's approval. 60
As this bill is considered by various congressional committees
on its path toward enactment, it is imperative that state central
panels be considered as "laboratory experiments" from which the
federal administrative system can learn. The central panels provide
lessons on issues surrounding implementation of pool systems, in
cluding the types of opposition that will no doubt emanate from
agencies fearing that their power will be diluted. The state central
panels are also pilot programs providing working models of utilizing
an administrative law judge for hearing a variety of cases, including
both regulatory and benefits adjudication.
Another lesson has to do with evaluation - a topic that in to
day's world may well come to the forefront of considerations revolv
ing around proposed central panel legislation. One key to any
evaluation system is acceptance by those being evaluated that the
system is objective and is used for the specific purpose for which the
evaluation is intended. The central panel, according to its propo
nents, provides the opportunity for a much clearer link between the
evaluation and its consequences.
Lessons from events surrounding Senate bill 262 and the ongo
ing central panel programs suggest that, first, the need to change the
current system must be carefully analyzed and documented. This
should include an examination of budgetary matters. Proponents of
the central panel approach believe that their system can deliver un
biased administrative justice at less cost. Budgetary considerations
were primary issues among the legislatures that enacted central
57.
May 12,
58.
59.
60.

S.1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see 129 CONGo REc. S6609-13 (dailyed.
1983).
S. 1275, 98th Cong., ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 562(a».
Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 564(c».
Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 565(7».
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panels, and cost is just as important at the federalleve1. 61 Cost justi
fications used by the states should be examined; aside from gut level
reactions and bottom line "before and after" analyses, however,
strikingly little data exists. Financial studies need to be conducted
that confirm or refute claims that central panel systems can be oper
ated more efficiently while providing equitable proceedings.
Second, lessons indicate that any ongoing evaluation to be part
of the proposed federal central panel should be designed at the out
set to make it as useful and as accepted by the administrative law
judges and agency personnel as possible. Evaluation can and should
be used for educational purposes - as a tool to determine where
changes need to be made. For example, a new program for behav
iorally disordered adolescents, being implemented in the Chicago
area, is utilizing a rigorous, operationally defined evaluation system
not just to determine whether the program is effective. In addition,
the results of the periodic evaluation will become part of the pro
gram's therapeutic component. 62 The therapist and family will dis
cuss the evaluation results to determine whether approaches to the
problems taken by the therapist and family need to be modified.
They will use the results to consider whether the goals of the therapy
were realistic and whether the family would benefit by continuing
the program in either its current or modified state.
Similarly, a carefully designed evaluation in the administrative
adjudication context can be used to identify problems with the sys
tem that all administrative law judges may be experiencing. And, in
the central panels, the evaluation provides the "excuse" necessary
for the administrative law judge to discuss general problems and in
dividual cases with the central panel director (if the evaluation in
cludes a personal interview component).
Another goal of evaluation is to increase the likelihood that the
best people are in the positions best suited to them and that they are
suitably compensated. But when evaluation is used for reward and
punishment of administrative judges, there should be a variety of
61. For a discussion on budgetary issues surrounding the central panel approach,
see M. RICH & w. BRucAR, supra note 9, at 23-25.
62. Illinois State Board of Education grant no. U4-20160 awarded to the A.E.R.O.
Special Education School District and the Foundation for Educational Research, Inc.
The evaluation system includes quantification of past educational records for use as con
trol variables and an on-going data collection effort during the delivery of in-home thera
peutic services. The evaluation program was specifically designed to accompany the
therapeutic component of this particular program.
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measures in addition to the viewpoint of one supervisor, such as the
opinions of litigants and attorneys.
In considering a federal central panel, it would be wise for
Congress to look at the role of the state central panel directors in
cluding the potential bias emanating from a process which allows
political figures to have complete control over choosing the director.
But in looking at the role of the director, the Congress should con
sider how using such a familiar figure as the director to conduct per
formance evaluation may make the system more palatable to
administrative law judges.
Senate bill 262 and the central panel system each provide les
sons to be learned by policymakers considering a federal central
panel system of administrative law judges. If such a system is to be
successfully implemented and maintained, we should not ignore
those lessons.

